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Abstract
Many debt claims, such as bonds, are resaleable, whereas others, such as repos, are
not. There was a fivefold increase in repo borrowing before the 2008 crisis. Why?
Did banks’ dependence on non-resaleable debt precipitate the crisis? In this paper, we
develop a model of bank lending with credit frictions. The key feature of the model is
that debt claims are heterogenous in their resaleability. We find that decreasing credit
market frictions leads to an increase in borrowing via non-resaleable debt. Borrowing
via non-resaleable debt has a dark side: it causes credit chains to form, since if a bank
makes a loan via non-resaleable debt and needs liquidity, it cannot sell the loan but
must borrow via a new contract. These credit chains are a source of systemic risk, since
one bank’s default harms not only its creditors but also its creditors’ creditors. Overall,
our model suggests that reducing credit market frictions may have an adverse effect on
the financial system and may even lead to the failures of financial institutions.
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1 Introduction
Credit frictions decreased substantially in the decades leading up to the 2008 financial
crisis.1 This coincided with the expansion of repo markets, which grew fivefold between
1990 and 2007. Before the crisis, the value of outstanding repos in the US exceeded
five trillion USD.2 The markets appeared to be functioning well, allowing banks to find
cheap, short-term liquidity. However, they were harboring systemic risk, because banks
were exposed to one another in credit chains. This meant that if one bank defaulted,
it harmed not only its immediate creditors, but potentially its creditors’ creditors as
well. This systemic risk manifested itself in the financial crisis, in which shocks to a
relatively small set of assets threatened to bring down the entire financial system. Did
the buildup of systemic risk relate to the decrease in credit frictions? In general, can a
decrease in credit frictions cause an increase in systemic risk?
In this paper, we construct a corporate finance-style model to address this question.
We find that the answer is yes. Our main result is that a decrease in credit frictions
increases systemic risk. This is because the decrease in credit frictions leads credit
chains to become more widespread, and these credit chains harbor systemic risk.
The key novel ingredient in our model is the heterogeneous resaleability of debt
claims. For concreteness, consider the salient examples of bonds and repos. Bonds are
resaleable, whereas repos are not.3 As a result, lending via repos leads to credit chains,
whereas lending via bonds does not. To see this, suppose you are a lender—you have
a loan on the asset side of your balance sheet—and you suddenly need liquidity. Your
options for raising this liquidity are different if you hold a bond than if you hold a repo.
If you hold a bond you can sell it in the market. In contrast, if you hold a repo, you
cannot sell it. Hence, you obtain liquidity by borrowing via a new repo. This creates a
credit chain, because you are now not only a creditor in the original repo, but a debtor
in the new repo as well. In summary, when you hold a non-resaleable instrument such
as a repo, the result is a credit chain. This brings with it systemic risk, since defaults
can transmit through the chain.
1Low credit market frictions in the US before the crisis reflected a number of factors, including advanced
information technology for execution and settlement, low transaction costs (Domowitz, Glen, and Madhavan
(2001), Jones (2002)), relatively low information asymmetries (Bai, Philippon, and Savov (2012),
Greenwood, Sanchez, and Wang (2013)), and a number of potential legal factors, such as privileged
bankruptcy treatment of some bank liabilities (Morrison, Roe, and Sontchi (2014)) and required financial
disclosure (La Porta, Lopez-De-Silanes, and Shleifer (2006)).
2See Homquist and Gallin (2014).
3That bonds are resaleable and repos are not is a formal legal property of these claims. Other financial
claims, such as derivatives, are also not resaleable; we comment on our model’s applicability to derivative
markets in Subsection 1.1.
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How does a change in credit frictions affect your choice whether to lend with a bond
or a repo? In our model, a decrease in credit frictions makes you relatively more likely
to lend via a repo. This is due to the fact that when you are an intermediate link in
a credit chain, there are two contracts that must be enforced, one between you and
your creditor and another between you and your debtor. Thus, you bear the costs of
credit frictions twice, once for each contract. If frictions are high, you have a strong
incentive to avoid these double costs. To do this, you lend via resaleable debt like
bonds. In this case, no credit chain is formed and systemic risk is low. On the other
hand, if credit frictions are low, you have a weaker incentive to avoid the costs of credit
chains. You may prefer to lend via non-resaleable debt like repos. In fact, in reality,
you have a strong incentive to use repos instead of bonds: repos are exempt from the
automatic stay in bankruptcy and thus they are effectively super-senior claims.4 When
credit frictions are low, the value of this super-seniority outweighs the cost of the double
incidence of credit frictions. As a result, credit chains form and systemic risk is high.
This is the essence of our main result: decreasing credit market frictions can increase
systemic risk. The reason is that decreasing credit frictions makes it is less likely that
banks issue resaleable debt and, hence, more likely that credit chains form.
Model preview. We now describe our model and results in more detail. We model
the interbank market within a classical corporate finance framework. At the core of
the model is one financial institution, which we call Bank A, that needs to raise finance
in order to scale up a project. Bank A borrows from a competitive creditor, which we
call Bank B. Bank A can borrow via one of two instruments, a bond or a repo.5 As
discussed above, a bond is resaleable whereas a repo is not. The amount that a bank
can borrow is limited by the assets it can pledge, via a standard limit to pledgeabity.
Specifically, the repayment a bank makes to its creditor cannot exceed a fixed fraction
θ of the bank’s assets. This fraction θ, which we refer to as the “enforceability” in the
economy, captures credit frictions. An increase in enforceability θ corresponds to a
decrease in credit frictions. At an interim date, after Bank B has made the loan to
Bank A, it may suffer a “liquidity shock,” i.e. it may suddenly need cash. If Bank B
suffers a liquidity shock, it raises liquidity in the interbank market from a third financial
institution, which we call Bank C. Specifically, Bank B raises this liquidity either by
selling Bank A’s bond to Bank C or by entering a new repo agreement with Bank C.
4See footnote 15 for a discussion of the special treatment that repos receive in bankruptcy.
5We use the labels repo and bond throughout for non-resaleable and resaleable instruments, respectively.
Note that when we think about short-term bank funding, the kind of bond we have in mind is commercial
paper. We discuss the applicability of our model to short-term bank funding further in Subsection 1.1 and
to more general abstract settings in Subsection 4.2.
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Bank B’s Sale of Bank A’s Bonds to Bank C
Bank A
A’s debt to B A’s debt to C
θC buys A’s bonds
Bank B Bank C
Figure 1: Because bonds are resaleable, Bank B obtains liquidity by selling Bank A’s bonds
to Bank C. No credit chain emerges.
Bonds are attractive relative to repos because they are resaleable. However, re-
pos are attractive relative to bonds because they are effectively senior to bonds in
bankruptcy. Thus, when Bank A borrows in the interbank market, it trades off the
resaleability benefit of bonds against the seniority benefit of repos.
For most of our analysis, we focus on this trade-off in the interbank market, but
we generalize our model in Subsection 4.2. There, we relax the assumption that non-
resaleable debt claims (repos) are senior to resaleable debt claims (bonds). Specifically,
we model general debt markets following Kiyotaki and Moore (2005) and show that
our main results are broadly applicable. For example, this analysis may cast light on a
borrower’s choice whether to fund itself via a bank loan (non-resaleable) or long-term
bonds (resaleable).
Results preview. First consider the case in which Bank A borrows from Bank B
via a bond. In this case, when Bank B suffers a liquidity shock, it sells Bank A’s bond
to Bank C. This sale is depicted in Figure 1. Observe that Bank A now has a debt to
Bank C directly. There is no credit chain. There is only one contract to be enforced,
the debt from Bank A to Bank C. Credit frictions kick in only once and Bank A’s debt
capacity is (roughly) proportional to the enforceability θ of this contract.
Now turn to the case in which Bank A borrows from Bank B via a repo. In this
3
A Credit Chain from Bank A to Bank B to Bank C
Bank A
A’s debt to B
θ
Bank B B’s debt to C
θ
Bank C
Figure 2: A credit chain emerges when Bank A borrows from Bank B via repos.
case, when Bank B suffers a liquidity shock, it must enter into a new contract to find
liquidity—because Bank A’s repo debt is not resaleable, Bank B cannot liquidate it
in the market. Thus, Bank B borrows from Bank C via a new repo contract. This is
depicted in Figure 2. Observe that Bank A has debt to Bank B and Bank B has debt
to Bank C. There is a credit chain. There are two contracts to be enforced. Credit
frictions kick in twice, once at each link in the credit chain, and Bank A’s debt capacity
is (roughly) proportional to the enforceability squared or θ× θ. Intuitively, there is one
θ for each of the two contracts.
Now consider how an increase in enforceability affects Bank A’s choice between
bonds and repos. As θ increases, the amount Bank A can borrow with bonds increases
linearly and the amount Bank A can borrow with repos increases quadratically. In
other words, the sensitivity of Bank A’s debt capacity to enforceability is higher when
it borrows via repos than when it borrowers via bonds. Thus, as credit frictions decrease,
Bank A switches from bond borrowing to repo borrowing.
What are the implications of increasing enforceability for systemic risk? We have
just established that increasing enforceability leads Bank A to borrow via repos and
that this, in turn, leads to credit chains. Credit chains harbor systemic risk because if
Bank A defaults on its debt to Bank B, Bank B may default on its debt to Bank C.
In our model, such default cascades can arise only when enforceability is high, because
that is when Bank A funds itself with repos and credit chains emerge. Note that even
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though increasing enforceability improves the functioning of each market individually,
it may have an adverse effect on the system as a whole, causing an increase in systemic
risk.
Further results. In the baseline model, we make the simplifying assumption that
Bank A’s project itself serves as collateral, even though repos and commercial paper
are typically collateralized by financial securities in reality.6 In an extension, we modify
the model so that Bank A pledges securities to fund an illiquid project. We show that
our main results are robust to the use of securities as collateral. However, the analysis
also raises an important question: why would Bank A prefer to use the securities as
collateral to borrow rather than to sell them in the market, avoiding the effects of credit
frictions? We provide a formal explanation based on heterogenous beliefs and find that
if Bank A believes the securities are undervalued by the market, it will use them as
collateral rather than sell them.7
We also explore six other extensions of our baseline model. This analysis affirms the
robustness of our main findings and provides new results. First, we show that our model
can be applied to many debt markets, not only to the interbank market. In particular,
our main results are robust to relaxing the assumption that non-resaleable debt (repos)
is senior to resaleable debt (bonds). Second, we consider Bank A’s maturity choice in
the presence of roll-over risk. We find conditions under which Bank A matches the
maturity of its liabilities to the maturity of its project, as we assume exogenously in
the baseline model. Third, we consider the possibility that credit chains may have
more than two links. We show that longer chains make repo borrowing relatively
less attractive. However, our qualitative findings do not change. Fourth, we ask how
systemic risk is affected by a relatively short-term stay on repos, rather than a full
exemption from stays. We show that a short-term stay is preferable to an exemption
in our setting, but that longer stays for repos are even better. Fifth, we consider how a
tax on repo borrowing affects systemic risk. We find that debt capacity is convex in the
tax rate, suggesting that a small tax may have a relatively large effect on the volume
of repo borrowing. Finally, we do a reduced-form welfare analysis. We explain that if
bank default is socially costly, then increasing systemic risk corresponds to decreasing
social welfare.
Policy. Our model is stylized, but may still cast light on policy debate. Should
6Our baseline assumption may be realistic if Bank A’s project is a financial investment—i.e. if Bank A is
buying securities on margin—as discussed in Subsection 4.1.
7There are also institutional reasons that Bank A may prefer to use securities as collateral rather than
sell them; for example, it may need to maintain ownership of the securities to meet regulatory liquidity or
capital requirements.
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repos maintain their special treatment in bankruptcy? The exemption from automatic
stays for repos makes repos more desirable to Bank A. Thus, the exemption leads
Bank A to undertake more repo borrowing and, hence, leads to more credit chains.
Since these credit chains are the source of systemic risk in the model, the exemption
from the stay exacerbates systemic risk. This finding contrasts with the arguments ad-
vanced by proponents of the exemption, who suggest that the safe harbors are “effective
in...limiting [counterparties’] exposure to possibly catastrophic losses from the failure
of the debtor. This is the very reason why Congress enacted the safe harbors in the
first place” (Exploring Chapter 11 Reform (2014)).
Our findings also affirm that regulators must take a macro-prudential approach, as
decreasing credit frictions makes every market function better individually, but makes
the system as a whole more dangerous.
Layout. The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. There are two remain-
ing subsections in the Introduction, first, a discussion of the realism of our assumptions
and the empirical relevance of our results and, second, a review of related literature.
Section 2 presents the model. Section 3 contains the formal analysis. In Section 4,
we derive further results by extending the model to include the financial securities as
collateral, more general instruments, rollover risk, longer chains, short-term stays for
repos, taxes on repos, and social costs of bank default. In Section 5, we conclude and
consider policy implications. Appendix A contains omitted derivations and proofs.
1.1 Realism and Empirical Evidence
While our model is stylized, we believe that our baseline model provides a useful approx-
imation of the interbank market, with reasonable assumptions and predictions. Here we
discuss these briefly in connection with empirical work. First, we point out that repos
and asset-backed commercial paper (a type of bond) are relatively substitutable instru-
ments for short-term bank funding. This is because they both have relatively short ma-
turities and they are often secured by similar collateral (Krishnamurthy, Nagel, and Orlov
(2014)). Second, we suggest that the bankruptcy advantage of repos is important, as
repo volume increased after Congress introduced the safe harbor provision (Garbade
(2006)). Third, we emphasize that credit chains are an important feature of the repo
market (repo chains are typically associated with the so-called “rehypothecation”8 of
collateral, see Singh and Aitken (2010) and Singh (2010)). Banks assume offsetting
long and short repo positions, even though many repos are very short-term and it may
8Since a repo contract is formally the sale and repurchase of assets, not the pledging (or “hypothecating”)
of collateral, the term “rehypothecation” is not favored by lawyers.
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seem that they should be “self-liquidating.” This may be because banks manage liquid-
ity over very short time horizons, taking offsetting positions within each day. Another
reason for this may be that many repos are of longer maturities, with an estimated
thirty percent of repos having maturity longer than a month (Comotto (2015)). Fi-
nally, many repos have “open” tenors, with no specified maturity. These are typically
thought about as overnight contracts, but a lender in an open repo must give its coun-
terparty notice before closing the contract; sometimes several weeks’ notice is required
(Comotto (2014)).
In our baseline model, we focus on credit chains in the interbank lending market, but
our model may also be applied to financial derivatives. In the derivatives market, the
analogy to the trade-off between junior, resaleable bonds and senior, non-resaleable re-
pos is the trade-off between standardized, exchange-traded derivatives and specialized,
OTC derivatives. Exchange-traded derivatives have the advantage of being resaleable.
Therefore, they do not lead to the formation of chains of counterparties. In contrast,
OTC derivatives have the advantage of being customizable, and they have the potential
advantage of providing insurance against specialized risks. Just as decreasing credit
frictions makes credit chains relatively less costly in the baseline model, decreasing
credit frictions makes risk-management chains relatively less costly here. Thus, when
credit frictions are low, OTC derivatives are relatively popular and risk-management
chains are relatively widespread: decreasing credit frictions can increase systemic risk
in derivatives markets just as it can in funding markets. Further, derivatives markets
grew even more dramatically than repo markets in the years before the 2008 crisis. The
notional value of all financial derivatives contracts was estimated at 766 trillion USD
in 2009, a three hundred-fold increase from thirty years earlier (Stulz (2009)). Repos
and derivatives often constitute a larger fraction of banks’ balance sheets than bonds
of all maturities combined. For example, in 2009 over forty-five percent of Barclay’s
liabilities were listed as “repurchase agreements and stock lending” (199 billion GBP)
or “derivatives” (403 billion GBP) on its balance sheet.9
Our application to the interbank market depends on the assumption that there
are frictions in the interbank market. In particular, we assume that there is limited
enforceability of contracts or, equivalently, limited pledgeability of cash flows. The
assumption is standard in the theory literature—for example, Homstrom and Tirole
9Barclay’s annual reports are available online here <https://www.home.barclays/barclays-investor-relations/
results-and-reports/annual-reports.html>. The Royal Bank of Scotland reports similar numbers (see
<http://investors.rbs.com/annual-report-subsidiary-results/2010.aspx>). The corresponding figures are
hard to find for US banks, since they classify their derivatives holdings as risk management instruments
and, therefore, are not required to list them on their balance sheets.
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(2011) make the assumption and provide a list of “several reasons why this [limited
enforceability] is by and large reality” (p. 3). We think that the realism of the assump-
tion for our application is demonstrated by the importance of collateral in interbank
contracts (Bank for International Settlements (2013))—if there were no pledgeablity
frictions, banks would not need to post collateral at all. In addition, the years-long
bankruptcy proceedings of Lehman Brothers demonstrated that bank creditors can
face severe frictions when trying to claim repayment. Further, we point out that our
model does not rely on the assumption that contractual enforceability is weak, but
only on the assumption that it is imperfect, which we believe it is for all contracts in
practice.
Finally, to emphasize the empirical importance of the problem we study, we remark
that several papers suggest that the systemic risk that built up in the repo market
may have played an important role in the financial crisis of 2008–2009 (Copeland,
Martin, and Walker (2014), Gorton and Metrick (2010), Gorton and Metrick (2012),
Krishnamurthy, Nagel, and Orlov (2014)).10
1.2 Related Literature
Kiyotaki and Moore (2000) also analyze how the resaleability of debt claims can mit-
igate the allocational inefficiencies that stem from limits to enforceability.11 They
demonstrate that a small amount of resaleability (or “multilateral commitment”) can
substitute for a substantial lack of enforceability (or “bilateral commitment”) in a deter-
ministic, infinite-horizon economy. Rather than focus on allocational efficiency as they
do, we study borrowers’ endogenous choice of instruments and analyze the implications
for systemic risk. Our analysis points to a potential dark side of enforceability that is
not present in Kiyotaki and Moore’s deterministic setting.
In another 2001 paper, Kiyotaki and Moore study credit chains. Rather than study
the transferability of debt, that paper shows how chains of bilateral borrowing can
emerge and, as such, it constitutes an early contribution to the growing literature
on financial networks. Many papers in this literature study systemic risk, including
Acemoglu, Ozdaglar, and Thabaz-Salehi (2013), Allen, Babus, and Carletti (2012),
Allen and Gale (2000), Blumh, Faia, and Krahnen (2013), Cabrales, Gottardi, and
Vega-Redondo (2013), Elliott, Golub, and Jackson (2014), Gale and Kariv (2007),
Glode and Opp (2013), Rahi and Zigrand (2013), and Zawadowski (2013). In only
a few of these papers, however, is the equilibrium network endogenous. An emerging
10Note that these papers differ in their conclusions about the way in which repos contributed to the crisis.
11In this paper, Kiyotaki and Moore develop a framework that they explore further in subsequent work,
including Kiyotaki and Moore (2001a), Kiyotaki and Moore (2005), and Kiyotaki and Moore (2012).
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theory literature takes a detailed approach to modeling credit chains in the repo market
specifically, including Kahn and Park (2015), Infante (2015), and Lee (2015).
Numerous other papers study the circulation of private debt, including Gorton
and Pennacchi (1990), Gu, Mattesini, Monnet, and Wright (2013), Kahn and Roberts
(2007), and Townsend and Wallace (1987). These papers typically do not consider
debt resaleability as a choice of the borrower and, therefore, they do not study the
implications of this choice for systemic risk.
We also hope to contribute to the debate surrounding the bankruptcy seniority of
repos and derivatives. Relevant papers in this literature include Antinolfi, Carapella,
Kahn, Martin, Mills, and Nosal (2014), Bliss and Kaufman (2006), Duffie and Skeel
(2006), Edwards and Morrison (2005), Lubben (2009), Roe (2011), and Skeel and Jack-
son (2012). Notably, Bolton and Oehmke (2014) bring a corporate finance model to
bear on the question of bankruptcy seniority, but they focus on the exemptions for
derivatives.
2 Model
In this section we set up the model, outlining the players and their technologies, the
debt instruments by which they can borrow, the specific nature of limited enforcement,
and the timing of moves. We also include a subsection describing several restrictions
that we impose on parameters.
2.1 Players and Technologies
There is one good called cash. There are three dates Date 0, Date 1, and Date 2.
The time between Date t and Date t + 1 is called “overnight.” Cash is the input of
production, the output of production, and the consumption good. The main actor in
the model is a risk-neutral bank called Bank A. Bank A has an endowment of e pounds
and a risky constant-returns-to-scale technology. The technology takes two periods to
produce, starting at Date 0 and terminating at Date 2. It has random gross return R˜,
which is RH with probability pi and RL < RH with probability 1− pi. Figure 3 depicts
the technology. We call the event that R˜ = RH “success” and the event that R˜ = RL
“failure.” Denote the expected return by R¯ := piRH + (1 − pi)RL.
12
12Note that we think about pi as rather large so that failure is an extreme event. In the repo market,
failure should be interpreted as the joint event in which Bank A’s project fails and the value of its pledged
collateral is not sufficient to cover its loan. We do not model this collateral explicitly here, but we discuss it
in the extension in Subsection 4.1.
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−(e+ IA)
pi
(e+ IA)RH (success)
1− pi
(e+ IA)RL (failure)
Figure 3: Depiction of Bank A’s technology.
Bank A funds its investment by borrowing capital I from a competitive market
of risk-neutral banks. The project is scaleable, so the quantity I is determined in
equilibrium. We model the competitive market in reduced form by having Bank A
make a take-it-or-leave-it offer to borrow from a second risk-neutral bank, Bank B. Bank
B breaks even in expectation but its preferences are uncertain: with probability 1− µ
Bank B values consumption only at Date 1 and with probability µ it values consumption
only at Date 2 (all random variables are pairwise independent). To be more specific,
with probability 1− µ Bank B lexicographically prefers Date 1 consumption to Date 2
consumption; with probability µ Bank B lexicographically prefers Date 2 consumption
to Date 1 consumption.13 We call the event that a bank wishes to consume at Date
1 a “liquidity shock.” The inclusion of the possibility that a bank is hit by a liquidity
shock is a simple way to generate a motive to trade in a secondary market before Bank
A’s debt matures—when hit by a liquidity shock, Bank B wishes either to resell Bank
A’s debt or to borrow against Bank A’s debt to satisfy its liquidity needs at Date 1.
Rather than viewing Date 1 as a fixed point in time that the banks know in advance, we
interpret it as a random time at which Bank B needs liquidity. Thus, since the arrival
time of Bank B’s liquidity shock is uncertain at Date 0, Bank A cannot borrow with
a contract that matures exactly when Bank B suffers the liquidity shock. We discuss
13The lexicographic preferences are just a modelling device that induces Bank B to have well-defined
preference for more to less at Date 2 even if it is hit by a liquidity shock at Date 1; this is important only
in the details of micro-founding enforcement constraints (see Subsection 2.3 below).
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Date 0
Bank A returns R˜
Date 1 Date 2
Bank A borrows from Bank B Bank B suffers liquidity shock Repayment
Bank B obtains liquidity from Bank C
Figure 4: Timeline when Bank B suffers a liquidity shock.
this further in Subsection 4.3.
For simplicity, we assume that Bank B has deep pockets at Date 0. By “deep
pockets” we mean that it has sufficient cash to fund Bank A at Date 0 so that Bank A
does not need to find a second creditor. If Bank B is hit by a liquidity shock, it uses all
this cash to generate liquidity at Date 1. We discuss the role of assets in place further
in Subsection 4.1.
There is a competitive interbank market open at Date 1, in which banks buy and
sell bonds in the secondary market as well as borrow and lend among themselves. We
model this by allowing Bank B to obtain funds from a third risk-neutral bank, Bank
C. Bank B can either sell Bank A’s debt or borrow against it. Again, competition is
captured by assuming that Bank B makes Bank C a take-it-or-leave it offer, whether
to sell bonds or to borrow against repos.
Figure 4 depicts the timing described here for the case in which Bank B suffers a
liquidity shock. Subsection 2.4 below gives a more formal description of the timing.
2.2 Borrowing Instruments
The crux of the model is the trade-off between borrowing via a bilateral contract called
a repo and borrowing via a resaleable instrument called a bond. In the model, two
features distinguish repos from bonds. The first feature is that bonds are resaleable.
A bank that buys a bond can sell it to another bank in the Date-1 market. The issuer
of the bond repays its bearer at maturity, regardless of whether this bearer was the
original owner at Date 0. Repos, in contrast, are not resaleable. A repo must be settled
by the writer and its counterparty. The second feature that distinguishes repos from
11
bonds is that repos are not stayed in bankruptcy.14 The counterparty to a repo recoups
its debt immediately, even if its counterparty defaults. The counterparty to a bond,
in contrast, must wait to liquidate until it is awarded the assets in the bankruptcy
proceedings.15 To capture the costs of waiting to liquidate, we normalize bondholders’
liquidation value to zero in the event of default.16 We assume that the realization of
R˜ is not verifiable, so state-contingent contracts are impossible.17 Thus, as in reality,
both bonds and repos are debt contracts, i.e. promises to repay a state-independent face
value in the future in exchange for cash today. We summarize the dimensions along
which repos and bonds differ in Figure 5.
A main question we ask is under what conditions Bank A will fund its Date 0
investment via repos as opposed to bonds. When Bank A determines its funding in-
strument, it will face a trade-off in borrowing costs. Repos decrease borrowing costs
because creditors have higher recovery values in the event of default; in contrast, bonds
reduce borrowing costs because they may come with a liquidity premium. This liquid-
ity premium is a result of the fact that lenders can sell them at Date 1 to meet their
liquidity needs when they suffer liquidity shocks. That is to say, borrowers trade off
bonds’ resaleability against repos’ super-seniority.
2.3 Limited Enforcement
The key friction in the economy is limited enforcement. We assume that creditors
cannot extract all of a project’s surplus when they collect on their debts. In particular,
there is an exogenous number θ ∈ (0, 1) that gives an upper bound on the proportion
14As mentioned in the Introduction, this specific assumption of seniority is not essential for our main
results, as we discuss in Subsection 4.2.
15The special treatment of repos is a feature of the US Bankruptcy Code. It is a legal advantage of
repos, which are formally not debt contracts but are rather sales and repurchases of securities. In the
event of a debtor’s bankruptcy, normal creditors are subject to the rules imposed by the court, whereas
repo creditors are not. Morrison, Roe, and Sontchi (2014) provide a detailed legal discussion of this spe-
cial bankruptcy treatment for repo creditors. They describe the advantages that repo creditors have
when a debtor goes bankrupt, pointing out that they can “exercise nearly all out-of-bankruptcy contrac-
tual rights.... Other creditors cannot exercise these contractual rights to terminate their contracts with
the bankrupt debtor; safe harbored creditors can. They are effectively exempt from bankruptcy” (p.
7). See also the legal opinions available from the Securities Industry and Financial Markets Association:
<http://www.sifma.org/services/standard-forms-and-documentation/legal-opinions/>.
16We make this assumption following Bolton and Oehmke (2014), because it provides an easy way to
model bankruptcy costs. In our model, it will also imply that the value of the bond in the event of default
is independent of enforcement frictions. In Subsection 4.2, we relax this assumption to ensure that it is not
driving our results.
17We make this assumption only to add realism to our application to the interbank market. Our main
mechanism does not depend on it. In particular, in the generalization in Subsection 4.2, the analysis does
not depend on the fact that Bank A’s cash flows are not verifiable.
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Two Dimensions of Legal Asymmetry:
Transferability and Bankruptcy Treatment
super-senior less senior
resaleable e.g. bonds, stock
not resaleable e.g. repos, derivatives
Figure 5: A table that depicts the two dimensions of legal asymmetry we focus on, trans-
ferability and bankruptcy treatment. Bonds and stock are resaleable, but they are junior in
bankruptcy to non-resaleable instruments such as repos and derivatives.
of assets that a creditor can extract from its debtor, heuristically
repayment ≤ θ × assets . (1)
Note that this proportion θ is the same for all debts in the economy. We refer to
θ as the enforceability in the economy. θ represents creditors’ power to extract repay-
ment from debtors; developments that we would expect to increase θ include efficient
liquidation procedures, strong creditor rights, standardized contracts, technological de-
velopment for improved record-keeping, and increased accounting transparency.
The formal micro-foundation we provide for the constraint above (inequality (1))
comes from borrowers’ incentives to divert assets and abscond. Specifically, θ is the
pledgeable proportion of assets. We assume that this fraction θ is not divertable. In
other words, a borrower with assets A has the option to divert (1 − θ)A and then
default. Thus a borrower will repay debt with face value F only if the residual value
net of repayment exceeds its gain from diverting, or
A− F ≥ (1− θ)A.
This inequality can be rewritten as
F ≤ θA,
which is simply inequality (1) restated symbolically. With this formalism, an increase in
enforceability is an increase in the collateralizability or securitizability of assets, which
makes it harder for borrowers to divert.
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Note Subsection 2.4 formalizes this diversion motive which leads endogenously to
the constraint in inequality (1).
2.4 Timing
We now specify the timing of the extensive game we use to model the economy. This
section serves mainly to formalize the sequencing that we have already sketched above.
Since bonds are resaleable but repos are not, we outline the timing for these two cases
separately. We describe first what can happen when Bank A issues bonds at Date 0
and then what can happen when Bank A borrows via repos at Date 0. The repo case
is slightly more complicated because credit chains can emerge.
The first move is Bank A’s choice of financing instrument:
Date 0
0.0 Bank A chooses either bonds or repos
We write the subsequent moves separately for the cases in which Bank A chooses bonds
and in which Bank A chooses repos.
Several of the moves below involve one bank making a take-it-or-leave-it offer to
another bank. Should the second bank reject the offer, it forgoes the relationship. This
captures the idea that the credit market is competitive.
Bank A Borrows via Bonds. If Bank A issues bonds, the game proceeds as
follows:
Date 0
0.1 Bank A offers Bank B face value FA to borrow IA
• Bank B accepts or rejects
Date 1
1.1 Bank B is hit by a liquidity shock or not
1.2 If Bank B is hit by a liquidity shock
• Bank B offers Bank C a resale price to sell its claim to FA from Bank A
– Bank C accepts or rejects
Date 2
2.1 The return R˜ on Bank A’s project realizes
2.2 Bank A either repays F to the bondholder or diverts and defaults
14
Recall from Subsection 2.2 that if the debtor defaults the bondholder’s payoff is nor-
malized to zero, reflecting the costs of bankruptcy stays.
Bank A Borrows via Repos. If Bank A borrows via repos, the game proceeds
as follows:
Date 0
0.1 Bank A offers Bank B face value FA to borrow IA
• Bank B accepts or rejects
Date 1
1.1 Bank B is hit by a liquidity shock or not
1.2 If Bank B is hit by a liquidity shock
• Bank B offers Bank C FB to borrow IB from Bank C
– Bank C accepts or rejects
Date 2
2.1 The return R˜ on Bank A’s project realizes
2.2 Bank A either repays FA to Bank B or diverts and defaults
2.3 If Bank B has borrowed from Bank C
• Bank B either repays FB to Bank C or diverts and defaults
2.5 Assumptions
In this section we make three restrictions on parameters. The first assumption im-
plies that Bank A’s project is a good investment, even if all revenues are lost due to
bankruptcy costs when R˜ = RL. Thus there is no question as to whether the project
should go ahead.
Assumption 2.5.1.
1 < piRH .
The second assumption, in contrast, says that the returns on Bank A’s project are not
so high that it can lever up infinitely. Specifically, it says that limits to enforcement
are severe enough (θ is low enough) that Bank A’s credit is rationed according to the
amount of its own capital it invests in its project.18
18Note that the alternative assumption that Bank A’s project has decreasing-returns-to-scale would also
prevent its project from becoming infinitely big; we choose the constant-returns-to-scale set-up because it is
a particularly tractable way to capture the economic mechanism we wish to study.
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Assumption 2.5.2.
θR¯ < 1.
Finally, the third assumption says that the return RL that realizes in the event of
failure is relatively low. The assumption suffices to ensure that Bank A will default in
equilibrium whenever its project fails (R˜ = RL).
Assumption 2.5.3.
RL <
(piRH − 1)RH
RH − 1
.
2.6 Equilibrium Concept
The equilibrium concept is subgame perfect equilibrium. We solve the model by back-
ward induction.
3 Results
In this section we solve the model. We analyze first the case when Bank A borrows via
bonds, then, separately, the case in which Bank A borrows via repos. We then compare
Bank A’s payoffs from borrowing via each instrument and solve for the equilibrium
borrowing instrument. Finally, we study the implications for systemic risk; here we
show our main result that increasing enforceability increases systemic risk.
3.1 Borrowing via Bonds
We now solve for the equilibrium of the subgame in which Bank A issues bonds. In
particular we wish to calculate its loan size IbA and its Date 0 PV Π
b
A, where the
superscript “b” indicates that the quantities correspond to the subgame in which Bank
A has borrowed via bonds.
In order to find the amount IbA that Bank B is willing to lend to Bank A against a
promise to repay F bA, we solve the game backward. We begin with the case in which
Bank B is not hit by a liquidity shock. In this case, it recovers the expected value of
Bank A’s debt. If there is no default, then Bank B recovers F bA and, if there is default,
it recovers zero. Bank A defaults exactly when it prefers to repay rather than to divert
capital, or when θ(e + IbA)R < F
b
A for R ∈ {RL, RH}. It repays zero when it defaults
due to the stay in bankruptcy and it repays FA otherwise. This is summarized in the
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expression below.
expected bond repayment =


FA if θ(e+ I
b
A)RL ≥ F
b
A,
piFA if θ(e+ I
b
A)RL < F
b
A ≤ θ(e+ I
b
A)RH ,
0 otherwise
= pi1{θ(e+IbA)RH≥F
b
A}
F bA + (1− pi)1{θ(e+IbA)RL≥F
b
A}
F bA.
Now turn to the case in which Bank B is hit by a liquidity shock. Now it sells Bank
A’s bonds to Bank C in a competitive market. Bank C demands its break-even value,
which is the expected value of Bank A’s debt. This coincides with the expression above
for Bank A’s expected repayment, i.e.
bond resale price = pi1{θ(e+IbA)RH≥F
b
A}
F bA + (1− pi)1{θ(e+IbA)RL≥F
b
A}
F bA.
Thus, when Bank A issues bonds, Bank B’s payoff is independent of whether Bank
B itself is hit by a liquidity shock. Bank B’s condition for accepting Bank A’s bond
offer, i.e. the contract (FA, IA), reduces to the participation constraint that Bank B
must make a positive NPV investment. This (ex ante) participation constraint takes
into account the (ex post) limits to enforcement captured by θ. Hence, we can rewrite
the first round of the game in which Bank A determines how much to borrow and
invest as a constrained optimization program. Bank A maximizes its profits subject to
its borrowing constraints. The next lemma states this problem.
Lemma 3.1.1. F bA and I
b
A are determined to maximize
ΠbA = E
[
max
{
(e+ I)R˜− F, (1− θ)(e+ I)R˜
}]
over F and I subject to
pi1{θ(e+I)RH≥F} F + (1− pi)1{θ(e+I)RL≥F} F ≥ I.
The program has a convex objective with a piecewise linear constraint, so it has
a corner solution. There are three possible solutions: (i) Bank A does not borrow at
all, (ii) Bank A borrows as much as it can while ensuring it will never default—i.e.
ensuring it can repay F even when R˜ = RL—or (iii) Bank A borrows as much as it can,
accepting that it will default when it fails but that it will still be able to repay when
it succeeds—i.e. ensuring it can repay F when R˜ = RH . The next lemma states that,
given the assumptions in Subsection 2.5, this third possibility obtains in equilibrium,
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Bank B’s Balance Sheet Composition when It Sells Bank A’s Bonds
Date 0
assets liabilities
debt from A all equity
−→
Date 1
assets liabilities
cash all equity
Figure 6: When Bank B sells Bank A’s bonds to Bank C, it does not assume a new liability.
i.e. Bank A will always lever up so much that it will default when its project fails.
Lemma 3.1.2.
F bA = θ
(
e+ IbA
)
RH .
Proof. See Appendix A.1
Because competition is perfect in the Date 1 market, Bank B sells Bank A’s bonds
at fair value if it suffers a liquidity shock at Date 1. As a result, Bank B’s Date 1 payoff
is unaffected by the liquidity shock and Bank B’s Date 0 break-even condition reads
IbA = piF
b
A
= piθ
(
e+ IbA
)
RH ,
(2)
having taken into account that the recovery value for Bank B is zero due to the stay in
bankruptcy. This says that
IbA =
piθeRH
1− piθRH
.
Before Bank B is hit by a liquidity shock, Bank B has Bank A’s debt on the assets
side of its balance sheet. In response to the liquidity shock, Bank B sells Bank A’s
bonds, replacing this asset with cash on its balance sheet. This is depicted in Figure 6.
Note that Bank B only ever has equity on the right-hand side of its balance sheet—when
Bank B funds Bank A via bonds, its balance sheet does not expand.
Now we can calculate Bank A’s expected equity value when it issues bonds. With
probability pi it succeeds and repays F bA = θ
(
e+ IbA
)
RH . With probability 1−pi it fails
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and diverts capital (1− θ)(e+ IbA). Thus,
ΠbA = pi
(
(e+ IbA)RH − F
b
A
)
+ (1− pi)(1− θ)
(
e+ IbA
)
RL
= pi(1− θ)
(
e+ IbA
)
RH + (1− pi)(1 − θ)
(
e+ IbA
)
RL
= (1− θ)
(
e+ IbA
)
R¯
=
(1− θ)eR¯
1− piθRH
.
(3)
3.2 Borrowoing via Repos
We now solve for the equilibrium of the subgame in which Bank A issues repos. In
particular, we wish to calculate its loan size IrA and its Date 0 PV Π
r
A, where the
superscript “r” indicates that the quantities correspond to the subgame in which Bank
A has borrowed via repos.
Again we solve the game backward to determine the amount IrA that Bank B is
willing to lend to Bank A against the promise to repay F rA. We begin with the case
in which Bank B is not hit by a liquidity shock. In this case, it holds Bank A’s repos
to maturity and recovers the expected value of Bank A’s debt. If there is no default,
Bank B receives F rA and if there is default, it recovers θ(e+I
r
A)R for R ∈ {RL, RH}. As
before, Bank A defaults exactly when it prefers to repay than to divert capital, or when
θ(e + IrA)R < F
b
A. In contrast to the case of bonds, when Bank A defaults, its repo
creditors are not subject to the bankruptcy stay and, hence, they recover the fraction
of assets that Bank A does not divert. This is summarized in the expression below.
expected repo repayment = pi
[
1{θ(e+IrA)RH≥F
r
A}
F rA + 1{θ(e+IrA)RH<F
r
A}
θ(e+ IrA)RH
]
+
+ (1− pi)
[
1{θ(e+IrA)RL≥F
r
A}
F rA + 1{θ(e+IrA)RL<F
r
A}
θ(e+ IrA)RL
]
= pimin
{
θ(e+ IrA)RH , F
r
A
}
+ (1− pi)min
{
θ(e+ IrA)RL, F
r
A
}
= E
[
min
{
θ(e+ IrA)R˜, F
r
A
}]
. (4)
Now turn to the case in which Bank B is hit by a liquidity shock. At Date 1, Bank
B now must find liquidity in the interbank market. In contrast to the case of bond-
borrowing considered in Subsection 3.1, Bank A’s debt to Bank B is not resaleable.
Instead of liquidating Bank A’s bond in the interbank market as before, now Bank B
must borrow from Bank C to obtain liquidity. It does so by borrowing IB in exchange
for the promise to repay FB. But now Bank C must anticipate the enforcement frictions
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Bank B’s Balance Sheet Expands when It Holds Bank A’s Repos
Date 0
assets liabilities
debt from A all equity
−→
Date 1
assets liabilities
cash debt to C
debt from A equity
Figure 7: If Bank A borrows via repos and Bank B needs liquidity at the interim date, then
Bank B borrows from Bank C. Bank B’s balance sheet thus expands, as it holds debt on
both sides of its balance sheet.
it faces with Bank B: Bank B will divert if its promised repayments to Bank C are too
high. Specifically, Bank B diverts if it profits more from diverting its repayment from
Bank A than it profits from making its promised repayment FB to Bank C. This gives
the condition that Bank B diverts whenever
θmin
{
θ(e+ IrA)R˜, F
r
A
}
< FB.
If Bank B does divert and default on its debt to Bank C, then Bank C seizes Bank B’s
assets and recovers θmin{θ(e+ IrA)R˜, F
r
A}. Note, now, that since the interbank market
is competitive (Bank B makes Bank C a take-it-or-leave-it offer), Bank B will always
borrow an amount IB equal to its expected repayment (given the face value FB), so
IB = expected repayment from B to C = E
[
min
{
θmin
{
θ(e+ IrA)R˜, F
r
A
}
, FB
}]
.
Further, since Bank B has been hit by a liquidity shock, it values Date 1 consumption
infinitely more than Date 2 consumption. Thus, it sets FB to maximize IB in the
equation above. Since the expectation is weakly increasing in FB, it is without loss of
generality to set FB =∞. Thus,
IB = θE
[
min
{
θ(e+ IrA)R˜, F
r
A
}]
.
Before Bank B is hit by a liquidity shock, it has Bank A’s debt on the assets side
of its balance sheet. In response to the liquidity shock, Bank B borrows from Bank C,
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adding cash as an asset on its balance sheet. This is depicted in Figure 7. Note that, in
contrast with the bond case depicted in Figure 6, Bank B now has debt on both sides
of its balance sheet—it has debt from Bank A on the assets side and debt to Bank C
on the liabilities side. In other words, Bank B is a link in a credit chain. When Bank
B lends via repos, its balance sheet blows up when it needs liquidity.
We now calculate Bank B’s expected payoff given it holds Bank A’s repo with face
value FA. To do so, we take the expectation of the value of the repo to Bank B across
the two cases above—the case in which it is not hit by a liquidity shock and holds Bank
A’s repo till maturity and the case in which it is hit by a liquidity shock and borrows
from Bank C,
value of A’s repo = µE
[
min
{
θ(e+ IrA)R˜, F
r
A
}]
+ (1− µ)θE
[
min
{
θ(e+ IrA)R˜, F
r
A
}]
=
(
µ+ (1− µ)θ
)
E
[
min
{
θ(e+ IrA)R˜, F
r
A
}]
. (5)
Bank A determines its repo contract (F rA, I
r
A) to maximize its present value Π
r
A. It
does so by making Bank B a take-it-or-leave-it offer such that the value of the contract
expressed above just induces Bank B to accept the offer. Thus, we can rewrite Bank A’s
choice of contract as a constrained maximization problem in which the objective is Bank
A’s PV and the constraint is that Bank B must (weakly) prefer the repo promise F rA to
its cash IrA. We can now rewrite Bank A’s choice of repo contract as an optimization
program. Lemma 3.2.1 summarizes.
Lemma 3.2.1. F rA and I
r
A are determined to maximize
ΠrA = E
[
max
{
(e+ I)R˜− F, (1− θ)(e+ I)R˜
}]
over F and I subject to
(
µ+ (1− µ)θ
)
E
[
min
{
θ(e+ I)R˜, F
}]
≥ I.
As in the program in Lemma 3.1.1 above for the bond borrowing case, there will
be a corner solution. Lemma 3.2.2 now states that in equilibrium Bank A either does
not borrow at all or it exhausts its debt capacity completely, promising the maximum
repayment.
Lemma 3.2.2. In equilibrium, Bank A either does not borrow, F rA = I
r
A = 0, or sets F
r
A
large enough to induce the maximum repayment,19
19Whenever F r
A
> θ
(
e + Ir
A
)
RH , the repayment does not depend on F
r
A
, i.e. min {θ(e + Ir
A
)R,F r
A
} =
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F rA = θ
(
e+ IrA
)
RH .
Proof. See Appendix A.2.
If Bank A borrows (i.e. if IrA 6= 0), then we can plug F
r
A = θ
(
e+IrA
)
RH from Lemma
3.2.2 into the binding constraint in Lemma 3.2.1 to recover the following equation for
IrA:
IrA = θ
(
µ+ (1− µ)θ
)(
e+ IrA
)
R¯. (6)
The enforceability parameter θ appears in this equation twice, because enforceability
kicks in twice, once at each link in the credit chain—Bank B has to enforce its contract
with Bank A and Bank C has to enforce its contract with Bank B. We can solve this
equation for IrA to recover
IrA =
θ
(
µ+ (1− µ)θ
)
eR¯
1− θ
(
µ+ (1− µ)θ
)
R¯
,
which allows us to write down an expression for the PV of Bank A when it funds itself
with repos. When R˜ = RH , Bank A repays its debt F
r
A = θ
(
e+ IrA
)
RH , whereas when
R˜ = RL, Bank A diverts a proportion 1− θ of its assets. Thus, if Bank A borrows,
ΠrA = pi
(
(e+ IrA)RH − F
r
A
)
+ (1− pi)(1 − θ)
(
e+ IrA
)
RL
= pi
(
(e+ IrA)RH − θ
(
e+ IrA
)
RH
)
+ (1− pi)(1− θ)
(
e+ IrA
)
RL
= (1− θ)
(
e+ IrA
)
R¯
=
(1− θ)eR¯
1− θ
(
µ+ (1− µ)θ
)
R¯
.
(7)
Recall that Bank A may prefer not to borrow and therefore prefer just to invest its
inside equity e into its project, in which case ΠrA = eR¯. Thus, the value of borrowing
via repos is the greater of the value of not borrowing and borrowing with face value
F rA = θ
(
e+ IrA
)
RH , or
ΠrA = max
{
eR¯,
(1− θ)eR¯
1− θ
(
µ+ (1− µ)θ
)
R¯
}
. (8)
θ(e + Ir
A
)R. Hence, any face value F r
A
> θ
(
e + Ir
A
)
RH is equivalent to F
r
A
= θ
(
e + Ir
A
)
RH in the sense that
it induces the same transfers for each realization of R˜. If Ir
A
6= 0, we focus on F r
A
= θ
(
e + Ir
A
)
RH without
loss of generality.
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3.3 The Equilibrium Borrowing Instrument
This section presents our main theoretical result that increasing enforceability θ leads
Bank A to favor repos and thereby leads to credit chains—Bank C lends to Bank B,
which lends to Bank A.
To determine when Bank A borrows via bonds and when it borrows via repos, we
compare its PV in each case by comparing the expression for ΠbA in equation (3) with
the expression for ΠrA in equation (7). This comparison is illustrated in Figure 8. Bank
A borrows via bonds whenever ΠbA ≥ Π
r
A or
(1− θ)eR¯
1− piθRH
≥
(1− θ)eR¯
1− θ
(
µ+ (1− µ)θ
)
R¯,
which can be written as
piRH ≥
(
µ+ (1− µ)θ
)
R¯.
With the above equation, we have derived that increased enforceability leads Bank A
to prefer repos. We now state this as Proposition 3.3.1.
Proposition 3.3.1. Bank A borrows via bonds only if
θ ≤ θ∗ :=
piRH − µR¯
(1− µ)R¯
and borrows via repos otherwise.
This result is the key result behind our main finding that increasing enforceability
can increase systemic risk, since more enforceability leads banks to rely more on non-
resaleable instruments—on repos—and borrowing via non-resaleable instruments leads
to credit chains.
3.4 Implications for Systemic Risk
In this section we analyze the effect of increasing enforceability on risk in the financial
system as a whole. Here, we analyze when risk on the balance sheet of a single institu-
tion can spread beyond that institution’s immediate creditors, in particular, when one
bank’s default causes the default of other banks. This is our notion of systemic risk,
which we call a default cascade and restate in the next definition.
Definition 3.4.1. A default cascade is an event in which a bank fails as a consequence
of another bank’s failure. In the model, this occurs whenever Bank B fails (which occurs
only because its debtor, Bank A, has failed).
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Bank A’s PV from Issuing Bonds and Repos as a Function of Enforceability
B
an
k
A
’s
P
V
enforceability θ θ∗ ≡ piRH−µR¯
(1−µ)R¯
ΠrA
ΠbA
Figure 8: When enforceability is low (θ ≤ θ∗) Bank A’s PV is higher from issuing bonds; when
enforceability is high (θ > θ∗) Bank A’s PV is higher from issuing repos. The parameters
used to make the plot are e = 1, R¯ = 1.4, piRH = 1.2, and µ = 1/2.
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Bank B can fail only when it has debt to default on. Bank B has debt only when
it borrows from Bank C to satisfy its liquidity needs. This occurs only when Bank
A borrows via repos. In this case, since repos are not resaleable, Bank B cannot find
liquidity by selling Bank A’s debt in the market; as a result, Bank B borrows from Bank
C creating a credit chain. Hence, Bank A’s default can lead to Bank B’s default—i.e.
default cascades can occur only when Bank A borrows via repos. The next result is that
default cascades only happen when enforceability is high. This follows as a corollary of
Proposition 3.3.1.
Corollary 3.4.1. Default cascades occur only when enforceability is high, specifically
when
θ > θ∗ ≡
piRH − µR¯
(1− µ)R¯
.
This result says that increasing enforceability increases systemic risk in the sense
that increasing enforceability can cause default cascades. Specifically, with repo bor-
rowing, a credit chain emerges in which Bank A borrows from Bank B and Bank B
borrows from Bank C. When Bank A’s project fails it defaults on its debt to Bank B.
This depletes the left-hand side of Bank B’s balance sheet, so Bank B cannot cover its
debt to Bank C and Bank B also defaults.
4 Generalizations, Extensions, and Robustness
In this section, we extend the analysis in seven ways. First, we explicitly incorporate
securities as collateral into our model. Second, we consider a more general version of
our model and argue that our results may hold in many debt markets, not only the
interbank market. Third, we consider the possibility that Bank A borrows via one-
period debt and rolls over at Date 1. Fourth, we allow for credit chains with more than
two links. Fifth, we consider the effects of a short-term stay for repos, rather than an
all-out exemption. Sixth, we consider the effects of a tax on repo borrowing. Finally, we
consider implications for social welfare, not just systemic risk. Our results are robust
to all these extensions.
4.1 The Role of Collateral
Repos and asset-backed commercial paper are collateralized by financial securities. In
our model, we have assumed that Bank A’s project serves as collateral for its debt.
In this section, we argue that our main results are robust to the use of securities as
collateral. We do this in two ways. (i) We argue that Bank A’s project may be
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interpreted as an investment in financial securities, where Bank A borrows from Bank
B to buy the securities on margin. With this interpretation, our model captures the
use of securities as collateral as-is. (ii) We modify the model so that Bank A pledges
liquid securities to fund an illiquid project and show that our results are robust. We
also discuss both economic and institutional reasons that Bank A may prefer to raise
capital by using its securities as collateral rather than selling them in the market.
Investment as buying on margin. So far, we have viewed Bank A’s project as an
investment in a real technology. However, given that it has constant returns to scale, we
can also view it as a financial investment in securities. With this interpretation, Bank
A wishes to invest in securities because it believes they are undervalued, i.e. Bank A
has the view that the securities will generate high returns and is willing to pay interest
to Bank B to borrow and invest in them. Specifically, Bank A borrows I from Bank B
and invests e+ I in the securities, pledging the securities as collateral to Bank B. This
corresponds to Bank A buying the securities “on margin” from Bank B, where Bank
A’s endowment e serves as the “haircut.” Given this interpretation, our model already
captures the use of securities as collateral in interbank markets. However, below we
explore another interpretation, in which Bank A uses financial securities as collateral
to borrow and invest in a real technology.
Collateralizing other securities. Consider the following twist on the baseline
model which gives a role for securities to be used as collateral. In addition to its en-
dowment and its project, Bank A holds securities that have Date-2 payoff s˜ ∈ {sL, sH},
where sL < sH . Denote the probability that s˜ = sH by p := P {s˜ = sH} and the
expected value of the securities by s¯ := psH + (1 − p)sL. Here, we assume that only
securities are pledgeable. Specifically, enforceability is zero for the cash flows that Bank
A gets from its project and θ for securities.20 Thus, Bank A must use its securities as
collateral in order to borrow and invest in its project. We assume that sL is low enough
that Bank A prefers to lever up and default if s˜ = sL (this is the analogy of Assumption
2.5.3, which states that RL is low). This assumption may seem not to apply to “safe”
collateral such as government bonds. However, the results in this section hold even if
the probability 1− p that the securities decline in value is very small, and realistically
even safe securities may lose value quickly with some probability. Finally, we assume
that, as in the baseline model, bond creditors recover nothing in bankruptcy, whereas
repo creditors still recover the proportion θ of the collateral, where here the collateral
constitutes the securities s˜.
20The idea that assets are pledgeable but cash flows are not is common in the literature. See, for example,
Hart and Moore (1998) or Tirole’s (2006) textbook, which suggests that “collateral pledging makes up for a
lack of pledgeable cash...borrowers must borrow against assets” (p. 169).
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Consider first the case in which Bank A borrows via bonds. Given that the securities
s˜ are serving as collateral, these bonds can represent asset-backed commercial paper or
short-term covered bonds. In this case, we can write Bank A’s borrowing constraint
analogously to equation (2): due to the bankruptcy costs associated with bonds, the
amount that Bank B is willing to lend to Bank A is limited by a proportion θ of its
repayment in the event that s˜ = sH ,
21
Ib,coll. ≤ pθsH .
This constraint binds at the optimum and Bank A’s PV is
Πb,coll.A =
(
e+ Ib,coll.
)
R¯+ (1− θ)s¯
= (e+ pθsH)R¯ + (1− θ)s¯.
(9)
Now turn to the case in which Bank A borrows via repos. In this case, we can write
Banks A’s borrowing constraint analogously to equation (6): because repos are not
resaleable, the amount that Bank B is willing to lend takes into account the fact that
Bank B may have to borrow against Bank A’s repo in the event that Bank B suffers a
liquidity shock,
Ir,coll.A ≤ µθs¯+ (1− µ)θ
2s¯
= θ
(
µ+ (1− µ)θ
)
s¯.
This constraint binds at the optimum and Bank A’s PV is
Πr,coll.A =
(
e+ Ir,coll.
)
R¯+ (1− θ)s¯
=
(
e+ θ
(
µ+ (1− µ)θ
)
s¯
)
R¯+ (1− θ)s¯.
(10)
Comparing this expression with Πb,coll.A gives the next proposition, which confirms that
the main results of the model are robust to the case in which securities must be used
as collateral.
Proposition 4.1.1. Bank A borrows via bonds only if enforceability θ is below a thresh-
old, i.e. if θ ≤ θs where
θs =
psH − µs¯
(1− µ)s¯
.
Thus, credit chains emerge and default cascades can occur for only high levels of en-
forceability.
21Note that since the project’s cash flows are not pledgeable, the amount that Bank A repays is independent
of the realization of its return R˜.
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Proof. See Appendix A.3.
Reasons to use securities as collateral rather than sell them. In the analysis
above we have assumed that Bank A used it securities s˜ as collateral to raise capital.
We did not consider the possibility that Bank A sell its securities in the market at Date
0 and invest the proceeds in its project, thereby avoiding the frictions in the credit
market. This assumption may be justified if there are institutional arrangements that
prevent Bank A from liquidating its securities even when it is efficient. For example,
it may hold securities on behalf of clients that it is not free to sell but is still allowed
to use as collateral. Alternatively, it may need to hold the securities for regulatory
reasons, for example to meet liquidity or capital requirements. However, Bank A may
also prefer to hold its securities to maturity rather than to liquidate them because it
places a higher value on the securities than it can obtain in the market, as we now
describe.
Suppose that Bank A believes that its securities are more valuable than Bank B and
Bank C believe they are. Specifically, suppose that Bank A believes that the probability
that s˜ = sH is p + ∆p, whereas Bank B and Bank C believe this probability is p, as
above. Formally, ∆p > 0 captures Bank A’s relative optimism, but it could also stand
in for other benefits that Bank A receives from holding the securities s˜. For example, if
the securities are shares, then Bank A may have private benefits of control from holding
them. Alternatively, the securities could be useful for risk management, hedging against
risks that Bank A holds elsewhere in its portfolio.
We now solve for a sufficient condition for Bank A to prefer to use its securities as
collateral rather than to sell them in the market. If Bank A sells its securities to invest
in its project, it raises their fair value s¯ ≡ psH + (1− p)sL in capital, so its PV is
Πsell coll.A = (e+ s¯)R¯. (11)
We now compare this to Bank A’s PV if it issues bonds under its own beliefs. Modifying
equation (9) to account for Bank A’s optimistic beliefs gives
Πb,optimisticA =
(
e+ Ib,coll.
)
R¯+ (1− θ)
(
(p+∆p)sH + (1− p−∆p)sL
)
=
(
e+ Ib,coll.
)
R¯+ (1− θ)
(
s¯+ (sH − sL)∆p
)
.
(12)
If this expression is greater than the payoff Πsell coll.A from selling securities, then Bank
A always prefers to use its securities as collateral rather than liquidate in the market.22
22Whereas this condition implies Bank A prefers to borrow via bonds than to sell its securities, it is not
a sufficient condition for it to borrow via bonds. It may still prefer to borrow via repos.
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The next proposition gives a condition under which Bank A will always use its securities
as collateral rather than selling them in the market.
Proposition 4.1.2. Bank A uses collateral as long as its optimism ∆p is above a
threshold, i.e. if ∆p ≥ ∆
∗
p, where
∆∗p :=
(s¯− θpsH)R¯− (1− θ)s¯
(1− θ)(sH − sL)
.
Proof. See Appendix A.4.
4.2 More General Instruments
So far, we have focused on the trade-off between borrowing via bonds (commercial
paper) and repos in the interbank market. In this section, we argue that our main
result—that increasing enforceability leads to credit chains and, therefore, increases
systemic risk—generalizes to other markets. In fact, the basic mechanism may be at
work in nearly all debt markets, even absent the formal, legal differences in resaleability
and bankruptcy seniority that exist between repos and bonds. The reason is as follows.
In addition to legal non-resaleability, fundamental economic frictions such as adverse
selection can inhibit the resaleability of debt.23 A debt issuer may mitigate these
frictions at a cost—for example by using securitization to combat the lemons problem—
and thereby make debt resaleable or “liquid” in secondary markets. When enforceability
increases, however, the relative benefits of resaleability decrease and, as a result, issuers
are not willing to pay the cost to issue resaleable debt. Thus, for high enforceability,
creditors, unable to sell their assets, may enter into new debt contracts to meet liquidity
needs. This is the creation of a credit chain, which harbors systemic risk, just as in our
baseline analysis. We formalize this argument below. The analysis in this section does
not depend on (i) the assumption that bankruptcy is costly or (ii) the assumption that
the outcome R of Bank A’s project is non-contractable. We make these assumptions
above only for realism of the application to interbank loan markets.
Here we abstract from legal asymmetries. Rather, we follow Kiyotaki and Moore
(2005) and assume that adverse selection frictions inhibit the resale of debt in the
secondary market, but that an issuer can pay an upfront cost to mitigate these fric-
tions.24 Specifically, we modify the model above in the following way. When Bank A
23See Kiyotaki and Moore (2002) for a list of reasons that “between the date of issue and the date of
delivery, an initial creditor C may not be able to resell [the debtor] D’s paper on to a third party...insofar as
D gets locked in with C ex post.” (p. 62)
24See page 703 of Kiyotaki and Moore (2005) for a discussion of this adverse-selection-based microfoun-
dation. Kiyotaki and Moore (2000, 2001a, 2005, 2012) make similar assumptions.
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borrows from Bank B, it can pay a proportional cost c to securitize its project. That
is, if Bank A securitizes its project, its returns are decreased by the proportion c to
(1 − c)R, R ∈ {RL, RH}. Securitization circumvents the adverse selection friction,
making Bank A’s debt resaleable. There are no bankruptcy costs. We now analyze
when Bank A will choose to securitize its project, forfeiting some returns but making
its debt liquid/resaleable.
Consider first the case in which Bank A does not securitize its project. Here its PV
is simply the repo PV expression in equation (8):
Πno sec.A = max
{
eR¯,
(1− θ)eR¯
1− θ
(
µ+ (1− µ)θ
)
R¯
}
.
Now turn to the case in which Bank A securitizes its project. Securitization lowers the
returns on its project, but eliminates the cost associated with the liquidity shock. This
observation allows us to write Bank A’s PV in this no-securitization case immediately.
We simply scale down the returns by a factor 1− c and replace the probability 1−µ of
a liquidity shock with zero:
Πsec.A = max
{
e(1− c)R¯,
(1− θ)e(1− c)R¯
1− θ(1− c)R¯
}
.
Now, Bank A securitizes only when Πsec.A ≥ Π
no sec.
A . This inequality leads to the
main result of this section, that Bank A securitizes only below a threshold level of
enforceability θ∗∗. Thus, credit chains emerge only for high levels of enforceability and,
therefore, increasing enforceability increases systemic risk as in Subsection 3.4 above.
We summarize this in Proposition 4.2.1 below.
Proposition 4.2.1. Bank A securitizes its debt only if enforceability θ is below a thresh-
old, i.e. if θ ≤ θ∗∗ where
θ∗∗ :=
1
2
(
−1 +
√
1 +
4c
(1− µ)(1− c)R¯
)
.
Thus, credit chains emerge and default cascades can occur for only high levels of en-
forceability.
Proof. See Appendix A.5.
This result demonstrates that our finding that increasing enforceability can increase
systemic risk is not specific to the interbank market. Rather, the interbank market
is just an environment in which systemic risk arising from credit chains is especially
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important and in which formal legal asymmetries make the trade-offs between resaleable
debt like commercial paper and non-resaleable debt like repos especially stark.
4.3 Rollover and the Timing of the Liquidity Shock
In the baseline model, we assume that Bank A can borrow only via a two-period debt.
Thus, when Bank B suffers a liquidity shock at Date 1, there is still one period before
Bank A’s debt matures and Bank B must raise liquidity from Bank C. If Bank A could
borrow via one-period debt, would it do away with the frictions in our model? I.e.,
would Bank A borrow via one-period debt from Bank B from Date 0 to Date 1 and
from a new creditor, Bank B′, from Date 1 to Date 2, eliminating the need for Bank
B to resell Bank A’s debt at Date 1? In this section, we briefly analyze two extensions
to argue that such an arrangement may be infeasible. First, we explain how “Date 1”
should represent the random arrival time of Bank B’s liquidity shock, not a fixed point
in time (as mentioned in Subsection 2.1). With this interpretation, Bank A cannot
write debt maturing at Date 1, because it does not know when Date 1 will arrive.
Second, we extend the model to include rollover risk for Bank A. Specifically, Bank A
may fail to find credit from Bank B′ at Date 1 and be forced to liquidate its project.
Random arrival of liquidity shock. Consider the following twist on the baseline
model: time is continuous in the interval between Date 0 and Date 2 and Bank B’s
liquidity shock arrives at a Poisson rate (1 − µ)/2. Thus, the probability that Bank
B suffers a liquidity shock at some time τ ∈ [0, 2] is 1 − µ. In other words, Bank B
suffers a liquidity shock with the same probability as in the baseline model, and the
time τ corresponds to Date 1 in the baseline model. Since τ is random, Bank A cannot
borrow from Bank B via a debt contract with maturity τ . Thus, Bank A cannot employ
a rollover strategy, whereby it borrows short-term twice, first from Bank B and then
from Bank B′.
In practice, many repo contracts are indeed short-term. This may reflect banks’
attempting to allow their creditors to close contracts easily if they need liquidity at an
unexpected date. However, in practice it seems like overnight is the shortest possible
debt maturity and, as a result, banks use offsetting repos to manage liquidity intraday.
Further, as discussed in Subsection 1.1, many repos have much longer maturities. This
likely reflects the fact that rolling debt over is risky, as we now discuss.
Rollover risk. Consider the following alternative twist on the baseline model in
which Bank A may face rollover risk at Date 1. At Date 0, Bank A can borrow from
Bank B via a one-period repo. In this case, Bank A must borrow from Bank B′ at Date
1, to fulfill its obligation to Bank B. With probability ρ Bank A borrows from Bank B′
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successfully and rolls over its repo position. But with probability 1− ρ, Bank A is not
able to borrow form Bank B′ in time to pay its debt to Bank B, so it must liquidate
its project to pay Bank B. We assume that the Date-1 liquidation value of Bank A’s
project is a fraction θ of its expected payoff, i.e. exactly the pledgeable fraction θ of the
project is recoverable in liquidation. This assumption simplifies the analysis, because it
implies that if Bank A fails to roll over its debt, Bank B is still repaid in full, but Bank
A is left with no assets. As a result, if Bank A borrows via one-period repos, it captures
the entire NPV of its project with probability ρ—with one-period repos, it borrows at
the fair price because it avoids the cost of both credit chains and of bankruptcy—but
with probability 1−ρ, it receives payoff zero—it fails to roll over its debt and liquidates.
Thus, the PV of borrowing via one-period repos is ρ times what the PV of the project
would be if it were funded with two-period repos, but the probability of a liquidity
shock were zero (µ = 1). From the expression for ΠrA in equation (8), we have the PV
of Bank A’s project from borrowing via one-period repos with rollover risk:
ΠrolloverA = ρΠ
r
A|µ=1= ρmax
{
eR¯,
(1− θ)eR¯
1− θR¯
}
.
Comparing this expression with the ΠrA gives the next proposition.
Proposition 4.3.1. As long as rollover risk is not too small, Bank A prefers to borrow
via two-period repos than one-period repos. I.e. as long as ρ is below a threshold ρ∗,
Bank A never borrows via one-period repos, where ρ∗ is given by
ρ∗ :=
1− θR¯
1− θ2R¯
.
This proposition says that the analysis of our baseline model is valid even if Bank
A has the option of borrowing via one-period repos, as long as one-period repos come
with some rollover risk.
Proof. See Appendix A.6.
4.4 Longer Chains
So far, we have focused on credit chains with only two links—between Bank A and
Bank B and between Bank B and Bank C. In this section, we extend the model to
include longer credit chains. Here we consider the possibility that liquidity shocks hit
not only Bank A’s immediate creditor, but also its creditor’s creditor, and its creditor’s
creditor’s creditor and so on. Thus, in this section, credit chains may become arbitrarily
long.
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We extend the model above to include a sequence of competitive creditors. We refer
to the nth creditor in the sequence as Bank Bn, so Bank B1 is Bank A’s immediate
creditor and, generally, Bank Bn+1 is Bank Bn’s creditor. With this notation in the
baseline model, Bank B would be called Bank B1 and Bank C would be called Bank B2.
Each Bank Bn suffers a liquidity shock with probability 1−µ, in which case it borrows
from Bank Bn+1. For simplicity, we assume that all liquidity shocks occur between
Date 1 and Date 2, but that Bank Bn borrows from Bank Bn+1 before Bank Bn+1
suffers a liquidity shock. As above, we consider the possibility of borrowing either via
repos or via bonds. Since the problem is stationary—Bank Bn’s problem of borrowing
from Bank Bn+1 coincides with Bn+1’s problem of borrowing from Bn+2—we restrict
attention to the cases in which all banks borrow via bonds and all banks borrow via
repos.
Consider first the case in which banks borrow via bonds. Since the bond is perfectly
resaleable, the credit chain does not affect its value. Thus, Bank A’s PV is simply the
bond PV expression in equation (3):
Πb,∞A =
(1− θ)eR¯
1− piθRH
. (13)
Now turn to the case in which banks borrow via repos. In this case, if Bank Bn needs
liquidity, it cannot sell Bank Bn−1’s debt, but must borrow from Bank Bn+1, extending
the credit chain. Each bank extends the chain if and only if it suffers a liquidity shock,
which occurs with probability µ. Thus, the length of the credit chain is geometrically
distributed with mean 1/µ, i.e. the chain has length one with probability µ, length two
with probability (1 − µ)µ, length three with probability (1 − µ)2µ, and length n with
probability (1− µ)(n−1)µ.
Repos are senior in bankruptcy and thus, given the analysis in Subsection 3.2 above,
Bank A repays Bank B a fraction θ of the value of its asset value in every state. Likewise,
Bank Bn repays Bank Bn+1 a fraction θ of its own value, which is a fraction θ
n of Bank
A’s asset value. Now, this observation allows us to write down the analogy of equation
(5) for the value of Bank A’s repo.
Assuming that Bank A borrows and denoting the amount Bank A borrows from
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Bank B1 by I
r,∞
A , we have the following:
value of A’s repo =
(
µ+ (1− µ)µθ + (1− µ)2µθ2 + · · ·
)
θ
(
e+ Ir,∞A
)
R¯
= µθ
(
e+ Ir,∞A
)
R¯
∞∑
n=0
(
(1− µ)θ
)n
=
µθ
(
e+ Ir,∞A
)
R¯
1− (1− µ)θ
.
To find the PV of Bank A’s project when it borrows via repos, we proceed by analogy
with the baseline model (Subsection 3.2). Bank B1’s indifference condition implies that
the amount of capital it provides equals the repo value of Bank A’s repo above, or
Ir,∞A =
µθ
(
e+ Ir,∞A
)
R¯
1− (1− µ)θ
which implies
Ir,∞A =
µθR¯e
1− (1− µ)θ − µθR¯
,
if Bank A borrows and Ir,∞A = 0 otherwise. This allows us to express the PV of Bank
A’s project as follows:
Πr,∞A = max
{
eR¯, (1 − θ)
(
e+ Ir,∞A
)
R¯
}
= max
{
eR¯,
(1− θ)
(
1− (1− µ)θ
)
eR¯
1−
(
1− µ(1 + R¯)
)
θ
}
.
(14)
We now turn to the equilibrium borrowing instrument. Bank A borrows via bonds
as long as Πr,∞A ≥ Π
b,∞
A . This inequality leads to the main result of this section, that
Bank A borrows via bonds only above a threshold level of enforceability θ∞, which we
summarize in 4.4.1 below.
Proposition 4.4.1. Bank A borrows via bonds only if enforceability θ is below a thresh-
old, i.e. Bank A borrows via bonds if θ ≤ θ∞ where
θ∞ :=
piRH − µR¯
pi(1 − µ)RH
and borrows via repos otherwise. Thus, credit chains emerge and default cascades can
occur for only high levels of enforceability.
Proof. See Appendix A.7.
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This result confirms our main finding of the baseline model: credit chains emerge only
for high levels of enforceability and, therefore, increasing enforceability increases sys-
temic risk as in Subsection 3.4 above. It also leads to an additional result. Comparison
of the threshold θ∞ above and the threshold θ∗ in the baseline model reveals that the
possibility of longer credit chains make repo borrowing relatively less attractive. We
state this as a corollary.
Corollary 4.4.1. In the extension with longer credit chains, the threshold above which
Bank A borrows via repos is higher than the threshold in the baseline model,
θ∞ > θ∗,
as defined in Proposition 3.3.1 and Proposition 4.4.1.
Proof. See Appendix A.8.
The intuition behind this result is that if Bank A borrows via repos, credit frictions θ
kick in at each link in the chain. If chains become arbitrarily long, this amplifies credit
frictions, making bond borrowing relatively more attractive.
4.5 Short-term Stay for Repos
Currently, repos and derivatives are exempt from bankruptcy stays, whereas bonds
and bank loans are subject to a stay of indefinite length, determined by the bankruptcy
court. In this section, we consider the effects of a fixed-term stay for repos. Specifically,
we suppose that in the default state, repo creditors receive a proportion λ of the value
of the debtor’s pledgeable assets.25 λ represents the inverse length of the stay: λ = 1
represents the case in which repos are exempt from the stay and λ = 0 represents the
stay of indefinite length, as in the case of bonds above. We show that increasing the
length of the stay for repos, decreases the likelihood that credit chains form.
To find the PV of Bank A’s project if it borrows via repos with a short-term stay, we
proceed by analogy with the analysis of repo borrowing in Subsection 3.2. In particular,
the amount Iλ that Bank A can borrow via repos with the “inverse length” of stay λ is
given by the analog of equation (6). We simply replace RL with λRL, since a creditor’s
25Throughout this analysis, we assume that Bank A chooses to borrow enough that it defaults if R˜ = RL,
i.e. Lemma 3.2.2 holds. This is the case as long as pi is sufficiently large.
35
recovery value is reduced by λ in the default state:
IλA = θ
(
µ+ (1− µ)θ
)(
e+ IrA
)(
piRH + (1− pi)λRL
)
= θ
(
µ+ (1− µ)θ
)(
e+ IrA
)
Rλ,
where Rλ := piRH + (1− pi)λRL. Thus we have that
IλA =
θ
(
µ+ (1− µ)θ
)
eRλ
1− θ
(
µ+ (1− µ)θ
)
Rλ
.
Now we compute the PV of Bank A’s project. As in the baseline analysis, Bank A
retains a fraction 1− θ of the asset value, so
ΠλA = pi(1− θ)(e+ I
λ
A)RH + (1− pi)(1− θ)(e+ I
λ
A)RL
=
(1− θ)eR¯
1− θ
(
µ+ (1− µ)θ
)
Rλ
.
(15)
Comparison of this expression with the expression for the PV of Bank A’s project if it
borrows via bonds (equation (3)), gives the threshold θλ above which Bank A borrows
via repos. Thus, we have the analog of Proposition 3.3.1 given a stay of inverse length
λ.
Proposition 4.5.1. Bank A borrows via bonds only if enforceability θ is below a thresh-
old, i.e. if θ ≤ θλ where
θλ =
piRH − µR
λ
(1− µ)Rλ
.
Thus, credit chains emerge and default cascades can occur for only high levels of en-
forceability.
Proof. See Appendix A.9.
This result confirms that our main result is robust to the possibility that repos are
subject to a short-term stay. It also allows us to analyze how Bank A’s choice of
borrowing instrument depends on the length of the stay.
Corollary 4.5.1. The threshold above which Bank A borrows via repos is decreasing
in the length of the stay on repo assets, i.e. θλ is increasing in λ,
∂θλ
∂λ
> 0.
Proof. See Appendix A.10.
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This corollary suggests that the length of the stay for repos can mitigate systemic risk.
Thus, policy makers should be concerned not only with the question of whether repos
should be stayed in bankruptcy, but also with how long they should be stayed for. In
particular, in the context of the model, a short-term stay for repo collateral can decrease
systemic risk, while still maintaining repos’ effective seniority over other instruments
such as bonds.
4.6 Taxation of Repos
In this section, we turn to the effects of taxing repos. We find that because each link
in a credit chain is taxed, the amount Bank A can borrow is convex in the tax rate.
Thus, a small tax may have a relatively large effect on the volume of repo borrowing.
Suppose that there is a proportional tax τ on repo borrowing, so that if a bank
borrows I, the government takes τI, leaving the bank to invest the remaining (1 −
τ)I. We also make the following additional assumption to prevent the equations from
becoming too complicated: Bank B always suffers a liquidity shock at Date 1, i.e.
µ = 0.26 In this case, Bank A’s maximum expected repayment to Bank B is given by
the analogy of equation (4):27
max expected repo repayment = θ
(
e+ (1− τ)IτA
)
R¯.
Since Bank B is always hit by the liquidity shock, it anticipates that it must borrow
from Bank C, at which point it will be taxed. Thus, the amount it is willing to lend to
Bank A is given by
IτA = (1− τ)θ × max expected repo repayment
= (1− τ)θ2(e+ (1− τ)IτA)R¯.
Hence the amount Bank A can borrow is given by
IτA =
(1− τ)θ2e
1− (1− τ)2θ2R¯
.
26This is effectively the same as the assumption that there are overlapping generations of short-lived
creditors in Dang, Gorton, Holmström, and Ordonez (2014). In that model, the initial creditor dies at the
interim date so it has to obtain liquidity from a second creditor to consume before it dies. In other words,
suffering a liquidity shock with certainty at Date 1 is equivalent to dying with certainty at Date 1.
27More precisely, this is the analogy to equation (4) with F r
A
= ∞. As in the baseline model, this is
without loss of generality whenever repo borrowing is profitable, since there are no bankruptcy costs for
repos (cf. Lemma 3.2.2).
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Bank A’s Repo Debt Capacity as a Function of the Tax Rate
B
an
k
A
’s
R
ep
o
D
eb
t
C
ap
ac
it
y
I
τ A
tax rate τ τ = 1
Figure 9: The amount Bank A can borrow via repos is decreasing and convex in the tax rate
τ . The parameters used to make the plot are e = 1, R¯ = 1.4, θ = 0.7 and µ = 0.
The effect of the tax rate on the amout IτA that Bank A can borrow via repos is depicted
in Figure 9 and summarized in the proposition below.
Proposition 4.6.1. The amount IτA that Bank A can borrow via repos is decreasing and
convex in the tax rate τ on repo borrowing. Further, it is continuous and approaches
zero as the tax rate approaches one. Thus, for a sufficiently high tax rate, Bank A
always borrows via bonds and no credit chains form.
Proof. See Appendix A.11.
The novel element of this proposition is that the amount Bank A can borrow via repos
is convex in the tax rate. This is a result of the fact that each link in the credit chain
is taxed—if there are two links in the chain, the tax is effectively squared. This finding
implies that the effect of an increase in taxes is largest when the tax rate is low. This
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suggests that implementing even a small tax on repos may have a relatively large effect
on repo borrowing.
4.7 Welfare Consequences of Systemic Risk
Our analysis has focused on systemic risk and how to mitigate it. Whereas many
regulations aim expressly to decrease systemic risk, we believe that it is important
to acknowledge that decreasing systemic risk is just one component of a regulator’s
objective function, and some policies that reduce systemic risk may have other costs.
In this section, we argue that, in our model, decreasing systemic risk increases social
welfare under reasonable assumptions.
We assume that there is a fixed social cost of each bank’s default.
Assumption 4.7.1. Each bank’s default has social cost D.
This assumption leads immediately to the result that the social costs of bank default
are higher when Bank A borrows via repos than when Bank A borrows via bonds.
Lemma 4.7.1. The social costs of default are higher when Bank A has borrowed via
repos than when Bank A has borrowed via bonds, i.e.
(1− pi)(2− µ)D > (1− pi)D, (16)
where (1−pi)D is the expected social cost of bank default when Bank A borrows via bonds
and (1 − pi)(2 − µ)D is the expected social cost of bank default when Bank A borrows
via repos.
Proof. See Appendix A.12.
Viewed in conjunction with Proposition 3.3.1, this proposition implies that decreasing
credit market frictions can decrease welfare,28 as we state formally in the next corollary.
Figure 10 depicts the social costs of default as a function of enforceability θ.
Corollary 4.7.1. Decreasing credit frictions (i.e. increasing enforceability θ) can de-
crease welfare. Specifically, increasing θ from below θ∗ to above θ∗ leads to an increase
in the social costs of default from (1− pi)D to (1− pi)(2 − µ)D.
28Note that decreasing credit frictions also has a positive effect on welfare. It allows Bank A to scale up
its project further. Thus, away from the cutoff θ∗ increasing enforceability has the standard positive effect.
However, we emphasize here the negative effect of increasing enforceability around θ∗.
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The Social Costs of Default as a Function of Enforceability
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Figure 10: When enforceability is low, Bank A funds itself via bonds and the social costs
of default are low; when enforceability is high, Bank A funds itself via repos and the social
costs of default are high. The parameters used to create the plot are (1 − pi)D = 100, and
µ = 1/2.
5 Conclusions
Paper review. In this paper, we have developed a model to analyze the connection
between credit market frictions and systemic risk. We argued that a decrease in credit
market frictions can lead to an increase in systemic risk and a decrease in welfare—
even though a decrease in credit market frictions makes each market function better in
isolation, it can harm the financial system as a whole. The reason is that in markets
with low credit market frictions, financial institutions are likely to borrow via non-
resaleable debt (e.g. repos) rather than resaleable debt (e.g. bonds), and borrowing via
non-resaleable debt leads to credit chains, which harbor systemic risk.
Policy. Our model is stylized, but we hope that it draws attention to some fea-
tures of debt claims and financial markets that may deserve more attention in the
policy debate. Most notably, borrowing via resaleable instruments mitigates systemic
risk. Therefore, a regulator aiming to combat systemic risk should encourage financial
institutions to fund themselves via resaleable instruments. Our model suggests that im-
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provements in financial markets that mitigate credit frictions (e.g., improving creditor
rights) may have the unintended consequence of undermining this goal: lowering credit
frictions may induce financial institutions to borrow via non-resaleable debt, increasing
systemic risk. In particular, the exemption to the automatic stay for repos appears
to have had unintended consequences, increasing repo borrowing, which led to credit
chains, consistent with the predictions of the model.
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A Omitted Derivations and Proofs
A.1 Proof of Lemma 3.1.2
Since the program in Lemma 3.1.1 is linear, it must have a corner solution. Thus, there
are three possible solutions: Bank A either borrows nothing, borrows the maximum so
that it never defaults, or borrows the maximum so that it defaults only when it fails.
The case in which it borrows the maximum so that it defaults only when it fails is
analyzed in the main text and yields expected equity value given in equation (3),
ΠbA
∣∣∣
repay if R˜ = RH
=
(1− θ)eR¯
1− piθRH
.
If it borrows nothing its expected equity value is
ΠbA
∣∣∣
borrow nothing
= eR¯.
Now, ΠbA
∣∣
repay if R˜ = RH
> ΠbA
∣∣
borrow nothing
if and only if piRH > 1, which is guaranteed
by Assumption 2.5.1. Thus, it remains only to compare the case in which Bank A
defaults only when it fails with the case in which Bank A never defaults.
If Bank A never defaults, it borrows as much as it can given that it does not default
in the event that R˜ = RL. Thus, it borrows
IA = FA = θ(e+ IA)RL
and its expected equity value is
ΠA|never default = pi
(
(e+ IA)RH − FA
)
+ (1− pi)(1− θ)(e+ IA)RL
=
(
pi(RH − θRL) + (1− pi)(1 − θ)RL
)
(e+ IA)
=
(
pi
(
(1 − θ)RH − (1− θ)RH +RH − θRL)
)
+ (1− pi)(1− θ)RL
)
(e+ IA)
=
(
(1− θ)R¯+ piθ(RH −RL)
)
(e+ IA)
=
(
(1− θ)R¯+ piθ(RH −RL)
)
e
1− θRL
.
Assumption 2.5.3 ensures that this expression is always smaller than ΠbA
∣∣
repay if R˜ = RH
from equation (3). Therefore, Bank A always sets FA = piθ(e+ IA)RH , as in the case
analyzed in the main text.
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A.2 Proof of Lemma 3.2.2
Since there are no inefficiencies from default in the repo case, if Bank A borrows it
is without loss of generality to assume that Bank A defaults whenever it borrows, i.e.
that F = ∞ if I > 0 or, alternatively, since R ≤ RH , that F = θ(e + I)RH whenever
I > 0. Thus it suffices to consider F = θ(e+ I)RH and F = 0, as stated in the lemma.
Note that a more explicit computational proof could also be done in exact analogy
with Lemma 3.1.2, but we omit it here.
A.3 Proof of Proposition 4.1.1
The result follows directly from the comparison of Πb,coll.A and Π
r,coll.
A in equations (9)
and (10).
A.4 Proof of Proposition 4.1.2
The result follows directly from the comparison of Πb,sell coll.A and Π
b,optimistic
A in equa-
tions (11) and (12).
A.5 Proof of Lemma 4.2.1
Recall that Bank A borrows via non-securitized debt if and only if Πno sec.A ≥ Π
sec.
A .
Recalling the expressions for Πno sec.A and Π
sec.
A in Subsection 4.2 from Subsection 4.2,
we see that a necessary condition for this is that the
(1− θ)eR¯
1− θ
(
µ+ (1− µ)θ
)
R¯
≥
(1− θ)e(1− c)R¯
1− θ(1− c)R¯
or, rewriting, that
θ2 + θ −
c
(1− µ)(1− c)R¯
≥ 0.
Thus, Bank A securitizes only if
1
2
(
−1−
√
1 +
4c
(1− µ)(1 − c)R¯
)
≤ θ ≤
1
2
(
−1 +
√
1 +
4c
(1− µ)(1− c)R¯
)
.
Since the lower root is negative whenever it exists and θ ∈ (0, 1), this is equivalent to
saying that Bank A securitizes only if
θ ≤ θ∗∗ :=
1
2
(
−1 +
√
1 +
4c
(1− µ)(1− c)R¯
)
.
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The proposition follows.
A.6 Proof of Proposition 4.3.1
As long as ΠrolloverA < Π
r
A, Bank A never borrows via one-period repos. From the
expression for ΠrolloverA in Proposition 4.3.1 and the expression for Π
r
A in equation (8),
this says Bank A never borrows via one-period repos as long as
ρ(1− θ)eR¯
1− θR¯
<
(1− θ)eR¯
1− θ
(
µ+ (1− µ)θ
)
R¯
or
ρ <
1− θR¯
1− θ
(
µ+ (1− µ)θ
)
R¯
.
The left-hand side above is decreasing in µ, so if it holds for µ = 0 it holds for all µ.
This implies that Bank A never borrows via one-period repos as long as
ρ <
1− θR¯
1− θ2R¯
≡ ρ∗,
as in the statement of the proposition.
A.7 Proof of Proposition 4.4.1
The result follows directly from the comparison of Πb,∞A and Π
r,∞
A in equations (13)
and (14).
A.8 Proof of Corollary 4.4.1
The result follows directly from the comparison of θ∗ in Proposition 3.3.1 and θ∞ in
Proposition 4.4.1, using the fact that piRH < R¯ ≡ piRH + (1− pi)RL.
A.9 Proof of Proposition 4.5.1
Given repos are subject to a stay with inverse length λ, Bank A borrows via bonds
whenever ΠbA is greater than Π
λ
A or, substituting from equations (3) and (15),
(1− θ)eR¯
1− piθRH
≤
(1− θ)eR¯
1− θ
(
µ+ (1− µ)θ
)
Rλ
.
Simplifying this inequality gives
θ ≥
piRH − µR
λ
(1− µ)Rλ
≡ θλ
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as stated in the proposition.
A.10 Proof of Corollary 4.5.1
We can restrict attention to the case in which θλ > 0. Otherwise, Bank A always
borrow via bonds. Differentiating gives
∂θλ
∂λ
= −
(1− µ)
(
µRλ + (piRH − µR
λ)
)
(1− µ)2(Rλ)2
∂Rλ
∂λ
.
This is negative since θλ > 0 implies piRH − µR
λ > 0 and
∂Rλ
∂λ
= (1− pi)RL > 0.
A.11 Proof of Proposition 4.6.1
Immediately from differentiation of
IτA =
(1− τ)θ2e
1− (1− τ)2θ2R¯
,
we have that
∂IτA
∂τ
= −
(
1 + θ2(1− τ)R¯
)
θ2e(
1− θ2(1− τ)2R¯
)2 < 0
and
∂2IτA
∂τ2
= θ4eR¯
(
1 + 4(1 − τ) + 3θR¯(1− τ)2(
1− θ2(1− τ)2R¯
)3
)
> 0,
so IτA is a decreasing convex function of τ .
A.12 Proof of Lemma 4.7.1
Bank A defaults with probability 1 − pi. Since no other bank ever defaults if Bank A
has borrowed via bonds, the expected social costs of default are simply (1 − pi)D if
Bank A has borrowed via bonds.
If Bank A has borrowed via repos, and only if Bank A has borrowed via repos,
Bank B defaults if and only if Bank A defaults and Bank B itself has been hit by a
liquidity shock. This liquidity shock occurs with independent probability 1− µ. Thus,
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the expected social costs of default are
(1− pi)D + (1− pi)(1 − µ)D = (1− pi)(2− µ)D.
Since µ < 1, the social costs are greater when Bank A has borrowed via repos.
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